The political scene since the inauguration of Mohamed Mursi as Egypt’s president has been extremely fluid.
The defeat of Ahmad Shafiq in the presidential elections was certainly an important victory over the plans of the counter-revolution. But it has not brought in a president who represents the revolution.
Instead we have a president who represents political forces that cannot and do not want to complete the revolution—and who wish above all to strike a power-sharing deal with the remnants of the old regime.
We have seen Mursi’s tacit acceptance of the Supplementary Constitutional Declaration—and an open understanding between him and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and big business.
We have also seen the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to break up their sit-in in Tahrir Square, alongside continuing procrastination over the issue of the detainees.
We now have a president who is not just comfortable with the Military Council, but is adopting a presidential programme which does not differ in its social content from the programme of the former regime.
Perhaps the symbolism of his trip to Saudi Arabia is the greatest proof of this. The Saudi regime is the centre of counter revolution in our region. It stands Tel Aviv and Washington and the remnants of the old regime.
But Mursi’s victory was only achieved through mass pressure from the streets. This has created a wave of expectations across wide sections of the masses about the continuation of the revolution and the opportunities for implementing their social and political demands.
This glaring contradiction—between a presidency denuded of its powers, unwilling and unable to realise any of the revolution’s demands, and the hopes and aspirations of the masses generated by the temporary defeat of counter-revolutionary forces—is a major determinant of the current situation.
So Mursi’s accommodation to the Military Council—which is not his first or his last—does not mean the end of the conflict between the two parties. Nor does it mean there is no possibility of renewed confrontation and a new wave of mobilisation by the Brotherhood in the streets.
Likewise the honeymoon between sections of the masses and the new president will not last long. The masses will discover Mursi’s limitations, just as they discovered the nature of the Brotherhood in parliament.
The promises Mursi made in Tahrir Square and the promises he made to the military at Cairo University and at Haikstep are a contradiction that can only explode in his face.
As expected, the capitalist liberals in the Third Alternative Front are afraid of the Brotherhood—and as usual they are being tailed by a section of the Left.
This will continue as long as they are blinded by their fear of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the root of their historic inability to take an independent stance.
For them, the conflict of the elites over the question of a civil or religious state is a top priority, rather than the actual conflict between the workers and poor of Egypt and their exploiters.
By contrast we do not distinguish between Naguib Sawiris and Khairat al-Shater, or between exploitation in an Islamic form and exploitation in a civil or secular guise.
Our project is the completion of the revolution and the realisation of its demands at the social, democratic and national levels. We will challenge and expose Mursi and his Brothers in their compromises and accommodation with the military and the remnants of the old regime.
We will challenge and expose their economic and social programme, which is hostile to the interests of the masses, and their dependence on the kings and princes of the Gulf and their masters in America and Tel Aviv.
We will participate in building a revolutionary front that is independent of the Muslim Brotherhood and the liberals, one that is implacably hostile to the military, to the remnants of the old regime, and to anyone who wants to stop or end the revolution.
Despite the temporary retreat of the movement in the streets, there is a new wave of strikes and social protests which will launch the next phase of the Egyptian revolution.
We will be at the heart of these struggles and on their front line, as we have seen how the Muslim Brotherhood and the liberals both opposed this new wave.
So we will struggle to organise, deepen and politicise the movement of the masses until it can become a genuine leadership for the Egyptian revolution in the new wave that is inevitably coming.
Victory to the revolution, glory to the martyrs, power and wealth to the people!
Statement published by Egypt’s Revolutionary Socialists on 8 July. Thanks to Anne Alexander for this translation. The original Arabic article is online at e-socialists.net/node/8885