Indonesian protesters in Yogyakarta
Can you tell me what shape the movement is in now?
There have been different phases of the movement. The protests intensified and peaked after police killed Affan Kurniawan, a motorcycle taxi driver, on 28 August.
Parts of the riots were most likely engineered by the elites, armed forces and police to justify a crackdown. But you can say the masses took their own initiatives in these riots.
The state tried to pacify the riots. But social movements such as unions, grassroots women’s organisations and university students—especially those based at more working class universities— still mobilised on the streets. And they intensified their social media campaign.
This resulted in a harsh response from the police and the army.
Flash points of this protest movement include not only big, major cities such as Jakarta and Bandung, but also smaller cities in the eastern part of Indonesia. It is a nationwide protest movement.
Interestingly, the masses at the forefront of the protests were outflanked by the accidental leadership of liberal online influencers. It is a real thing in Indonesian politics recently, perhaps a peculiarity of a peripheral capitalist country.
Young liberal online influencers compiled a list of demands initially made by social movements, students and working class organisations. These are the “17+8 demands”—a reference to the Indonesian date of independence, 17 August 1945.
These floating liberals had links to the developmentalist consultancy industry—one of them was actually a World Bank consultant. They made the demands viral, and one is threatened with a defamation charge from the army.
But they are divorced from actual working class bases and organisations. And their political intervention ended up downplaying the real contribution of the working class and mass base.
At points they even moderated the radicalised masses, encouraging them to “go home and take some rest” after the state agreed to three of the 25 demands.
How would you describe Indonesian society in terms of class inequality? Does its unequal nature cause resentment?
Class inequality has become worse, and impacted even the “middle class” professionals and white collar workers.
Another group highly impacted are the gig workers—the motorcycle taxi drivers. They are the contemporary version of railway workers in the previous century. Organised, increasingly militant and holding the “choke points” of Indonesian capitalism, especially in urban areas.
Interestingly, this class sentiment has spilled into popular culture. Other than huge social media campaigns, the most striking expression of this resentment is the hoisting of the Straw Hat Jolly Roger flag from the popular Japanese manga series One Piece.
People raised the One Piece flag at home, on their vehicles and in public places. The Indonesian government at one point clamped down, saying the public display of the flag was a “threat to national unity”.
Are protesters against the whole system, rather than some individual members of the ruling elite?
As I mentioned above, class inequality. But I think there are three major drivers of the protests.
Firstly, the growing political centrality of the oligarchy. Corporations, new oligarchs and entrepreneurs, old economic and political elites are all becoming more invested in the politics of defending their wealth and the interests of the ruling class as a whole.
Second, and correspondingly, this leads to growing inequality and a declining quality of life. This isn’t just the traditional working class. “White collar” workers and “middle class” professionals have adopted phrases on social media such as #DarkIndonesia (Indonesia Gelap) or #Let’sEscapeFirst (Kabur Aja Dulu).
There is a growing militancy among unions and rank and file workers in the not very unionised, but highly organised, gig economy and motorcycle taxi drivers
They call for skilled workers to leave Indonesia, given that it is increasingly difficult to make ends meet in the country.
As a result, third is the contraction of democratic space to serve elite and oligarchic interests. Perhaps the most controversial of this step was the proposal to revise the current Armed Forces Bill, which will allow the military to play a more active role in politics.
The movement so far seems comprised of students, democracy activists and sections of the urban poor. Is that a new coalition? Can it reach the working class?
Yes that’s correct, but what is new is two things. First is the rising level of political consciousness among the public.
Second is the somewhat self-centred, naive attempt of the liberals to intervene in this process. But despite this tension and the fact that the movement is somewhat receding, it has reached many ordinary workers.
There is a growing militancy among unions and rank and file workers in the not very unionised, but highly organised, gig economy and motorcycle taxi drivers. They are organised primarily through informal networks and mutual aid societies.
Have the protests caused any arguments inside the working class that could be taken advantage of in the future?
The real split is between the reformist tendency and the more radical tendency. The former is shaped by the liberal influencers, shared by members of the middle and managerial class, and some sections of the NGOs.
The more progressive aspects are shaped by unions, social movements, lower-income workers including activists and NGO workers.
There is a growing criticism towards the reformists. This can be utilised by the more progressive sections to exert their leadership and push for a more comprehensive implementation of the people’s demands.
The ruling class appeared united against the revolt. But does the movement have the potential to splinter them?
Yes, they are united, but my reading is that there are sections of the political elites, and even the capitalist class, who see president Prabowo Subianto’s tenure as unstable.
They would like to see some accommodations to appease the masses. It is an uphill task for the movement to splinter them. But I think this should be a goal. This would create a significant opening for the advancement of class struggle in Indonesia.
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