Syria and the war on the Kurds

A Kurdish protest on the streets of London (Picture: Guy Smallman)

The Kurds are under attack from the Syrian government. After weeks of clashes with Ahmed al-Sharaa’s regime, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been weakened and forced to retreat.

On 30 January, al-Sharaa and the SDF reached an agreement which will lead to the gradual integration of Kurdish forces into the Syrian state.

Kurdish forces took control of north east Syria after dictator Bashar al-Assad launched a sectarian civil war to put down a popular revolution in 2011. The area was known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES)—or Rojava.

The civil war saw imperialist and regional powers intervene and back rival groups on the ground.

Al-Sharaa’s HTS, which ran large parts of north west Syria, toppled the Assad regime in December 2024 in a lightning offensive. It emerged in 2017 out of a series of mergers of armed Islamist groups that grew during the civil war.

The United States supported the SDF to further its own imperialist interests in the region. It did so under the guise of “fighting terrorism” when Isis, a reactionary and sectarian group, took control of large swathes of Syria and Iraq from 2014.

In reality, Isis had grown out of the West’s destruction of Iraqi society and use of sectarian divide and rule tactics in the 2000s.

Today, US president Donald Trump is busy building links with al-Sharaa’s regime and has praised its assault on the SDF.

It’s part of a long history of imperialist [powers claiming to stand with the Kurds—and betraying them.

Syria, Turkey and the war on the Kurds

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Britain and France denied the Kurds a state in the imperial carve-up of the Middle East after the First World War. To this day, the Kurds remain scattered across Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.

In the 1970s, it supported Kurdish groups against the Iraqi Ba’athist regime to bolster neighbouring Iran, then an ally of the US. But it soon abandoned them.

Iran became an adversary of the US, which encouraged Iraq to invade. And the West supplied the gas that the Iraqi regime used to chemical bomb the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1998.

By 1991, the US wanted to remove the Iraqi regime. It encouraged Kurdish rebellions in support of its first invasion of the country—only to abandon them to be massacred.

All this shows that liberation can’t come through the cynical promises of imperialist powers—it can only be won by challenging them. Hope lies with workers and the poor across the region fighting against their own rulers and imperialist powers from below.

And in Britain the left should demand the British state stops backing regimes that repress the Kurds. 

SW: What has been the damage done by Ahmed al-Sharaa’s attacks? There is currently a tentative ceasefire in place—is that being undermined?

Taken as a whole, the damage caused by al-Sharaa’s offensive against Kurdish areas is multi-layered—humanitarian, political, social, and security-related.

The agreement on 30 January between SDF leader Mazloum Abdi and Ahmed al-Sharaa reframes the situation as a permanent truce.

The Kurds are not warmongers—they seek to live in peace with everyone. And they remember the HTS attacks on the Alawite and Druze minorities.

The most immediate damage from HTS attacks on the Kurds has been civilian and humanitarian. Kurdish neighbourhoods, particularly in contested urban areas, have experienced shelling, siege-like conditions, disruption of essential services and restrictions on movement.

This has created fear, trauma and displacement. Even where fighting is paused, people are unsure if the new arrangements will provide real protection.

A second layer of damage is political. The attacks and subsequent agreement have accelerated the erosion of Kurdish autonomy and bargaining power. Over a decade of de facto self-administration has been curtailed.

The 30 January agreement aims to end large-scale fighting, but it does not erase the legacy of militarisation. The transition from autonomous control to Syrian state-led security is marked by deep mistrust.

SW: Is Mazloum Abdi under pressure to integrate the SDF into the Syrian government?

Yes, the agreements show that Mazloum Abdi is under intense pressure to integrate the SDF into the Syrian state.

The withdrawal of the SDF from key cities and the compression of Kurdish-held territory significantly weakened Abdi’s bargaining position. It has made integration appear as the only viable way to prevent further large-scale violence and protect civilians.

From al-Sharaa’s perspective, integration is a means of reasserting sovereignty and dismantling Kurdish autonomy.

Turkey’s role intensifies this pressure. President Erdogan continues to frame the SDF as a security threat. The prospect of renewed Turkish military intervention narrows Abdi’s options—integration appears as a lesser evil compared to military confrontation with Turkey.

Abdi’s engagement in integration talks is therefore best understood as crisis management—it is not a voluntary alignment with the Syrian state.

The future of the SDF without strong international backing is significantly constrained. Reduced external support increases reliance on negotiations with al-Sharaa.

The danger is that integration proceeds faster than protections can be enforced.

SW: Are there splits within the SDF over integration with the Syrian regime?

There are no obvious splits within the Kurdish core of the Syrian Democratic Forces and no break from Mazloum Abdi’s leadership. Abdi remains a unifying symbol. Kurdish fighters and communities continue to rally around him, even under intense external pressure.

Kurdish unity has largely held because Abdi is widely seen as acting in good faith and out of necessity.

The tensions that have emerged within the broader SDF stem mainly from some Arab components.

SW: What is the situation among Kurds in Turkey? What is the pro-Kurdish DEM party saying about the situation?

Kurds in Turkey are anxious. Protests and strong emotional reactions reflect the wider fears that Kurdish gains across the border are being dismantled.

These events also feed back into domestic Kurdish politics, shaping trust in any peace or reconciliation process between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

The pro-Kurdish DEM Party has consistently argued that violence against Kurds in Syria undermines peace inside Turkey. It has called for de-escalation, humanitarian protection, and a political rather than military approach.

DEM has supported protests and public advocacy, while also operating under tight legal and political constraints.

SW: Al-Sharaa has attacked all minorities in Syria—Druze, Alawites, Christians and others. If there is integration, what does it mean for Kurds in Syria and the wider independence struggle?

Integration under current conditions would represent a profound shift for Kurds in Syria. It would, to an extent, transfer responsibility for Kurdish security from Kurdish-led forces to the Syrian state.

This raises serious concerns given the recent record of violence affecting multiple minority groups.

The central fear is that integration becomes a one-way process. Kurdish deterrence and autonomy are surrendered first, while promised safeguards remain weak or unenforced.

Integration in Syria will reverberate across the Kurdish political landscape.

Rojava has been the most visible example of Kurdish self-rule. If absorbed into a centralised state, Kurds elsewhere could see that as evidence that autonomy projects can be dismantled under sustained pressure.

This may weaken morale and narrow political horizons—particularly in Turkey and Iran.

Integration does not end Kurdish aspirations, but it reshapes them. The wider struggle may become more cautious, focused on rights rather than on autonomy or independence.