Syria, Turkey and the war on the Kurds

A protest in solidarity with Rojava in London on Friday (Picture: Guy Smallman)

Kurds are under attack from Ahmed al-Sharaa’s new regime in Syria. A tentative ceasefire is in place, but the Syrian government has violently undermined Kurdish autonomy. 

The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) took control of the north east during the Syrian civil war. The former dictator, Bashar al-Assad, launched sectarian bloodbath in response to a popular revolution in 2011. 

The SDF have gone from controlling nearly a third of the country to just a few key cities.  

Al-Sharaa, whose HTS forces toppled the Assad dictatorship in December 2024, is determined to secure the new regime’s control. 

This has meant whipping up sectarian divisions—continuing a favoured tactic of Assad—and attacks on all minorities. 

Al-Sharaa is determined to dissolve SDF forces into the Syrian state. SDF leader Mazloum Abdi has signalled he’s open to a deal, but he cannot find a consensus within Kurdish forces.  

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who rules neighbouring Turkey, is a core supporter of al-Sharra and stands to gain for undermining Kurdish autonomy in Syria. 

The Turkish state has been repressing its own Kurdish minority. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which waged a struggle against the Turkish state, is allied to parts of the SDF. 

The US previously supported the SDF in the civil war as a way of furthering the interests of Western imperialism in the region. But it has now predictably thrown the Kurds under the bus in favour of building ties with al-Sharaa’s regime. 

Kurdish liberation will require mass resistance from below free from the US and all the imperialist powers. 

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government has attacked all the minorities in Syria. Why is he attacking the Kurds now?

Al-Sharaa’s vision for Syria is an authoritarian and sectarian regime. Therefore, he views all segments demanding a pluralistic and secular Syria as a potential threat—this includes the Kurds. 

He has previously attacked the Alawites and the Druze. But his aggression towards the Kurds now is because he has reached a recent consensus with regional players—the US, Israel and Turkey. 

With the US, al-Sharaa agreed that no other power is needed to fight against the remnants of Isis. This has previously been the role of Kurdish forces, but al-Sharaa has said his government will be a reliable partner. 

With Israel, he agreed that he would not cause trouble regarding the Syrian territories occupied by Israel, such as the Golan Heights. 

With Turkey, al-Sharaa agreed to continue active cooperation and support. This began before Bashar al-Assad’s regime was toppled, and will now continue in exchange for narrowing the SDF’s sphere of influence. 

Al-Sharaa’s transformation over the last year—from being on a terror list to a head of state—has facilitated his aggression inside Syria. 

The US views al-Sharaa as a force capable of controlling the entirety of Syria—now it prefers to work with him.

Erdogan was a core supporter of al-Sharaa during the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad and now supports his government. Does he stand to gain from the ongoing attacks on the Kurds?

From the perspective of Erdogan and the Turkish state, the Kurds’ autonomous political structure in Syria has always been seen as an existential threat. Turkey itself has a long history of Kurdish repression. 

Erdogan’s first peace process with the Kurds in 2013-15 ended due to the panic created by the Kurdish gains in Rojava in Syria. 

Turkey believed that if this administration possessed the same international legitimacy as the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, it would strengthen similar demands in Turkey. Erdogan saw this as a threat to his government. 

For this reason, Turkey organised two major operations in 2018 and 2020 against north eastern Syria to undermine the SDF’s control. It supported many armed groups that are now at the centre of Syria’s new regime and tried to present the recent attacks as the “liberation” of north eastern Syria from the SDF. 

Erdogan has begun a renewed peace process with Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK). In May last year, Ocalan called the PKK to end its armed struggle. Is there a link between the peace negotiations with Ocalan and al-Sharaa’s current moves against the Kurds?

For Erdogan, minimising SDF control in Syria will strengthen his own hand in the recent peace process within Turkey.

The fundamental question was whether Ocalan’s approach of peaceful political struggle, rather than armed struggle, included Kurdish groups in Syria. 

The agreement signed by al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi in March 2025, was an institutional and legal framework that Ocalan also adhered to.

Erdogan’s AKP party claimed that the SDF delayed the steps required by this agreement. From the very beginning, Ocalan tried to ensure the process was pulled into the political sphere to prevent the kind of attack occurring in Syria now. 

In the most recent meetings Ocalan emphasised that the fighting happening in Syria is intended to sabotage the peace process.

Is there opposition in Turkey against the assault on the Kurds? What has been the response of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the AKP’s main opposition?

It’s mainly the organised left which are opposing the attacks. Mainstream political parties cannot adopt a different political line to the government on the Kurdish issue. 

The atmosphere of “national unity” paves the way for violent, nationalist attacks against those who express contrary views.

And for the first time in a while, fascists organised counter-protests to the left.

But despite everything, the CHP has reacted differently compared to the past. Leader Ozgur Ozel has emphasised that everyone living in Syria are brothers and sisters of the people living in Turkey. That was significant.

However, attitudes which equate the SDF with the PKK and support al-Sharaa’s regime’s attacks as a “struggle against terrorism” are common. They are clear in both the CHP’s social base and the mainstream opposition.

The Kurds have again been betrayed by the US. Are there arguments about this? 

Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger once said, “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be its friend is fatal.” 

The US viewed the SDF as a military ally in its war against Isis. But now al-Sharra’s regime can play that role, and Trump is making deals to boost the US’s regional influence. 

The most common sentiment among Kurds in Turkey is to stand up for Rojava and stand in solidarity with it.

We have to fight to ensure that the peace process in Turkey proceeds in a way that Kurds can guarantee their rights. And we must simultaneously oppose al-Sharaa’s recent attacks. 

Regarding the peace process, there were two conflicting visions from the start. The AKP government vision reduces peace to the disarmament and dissolution of the PKK. The Kurdish vision actually involves social justice and lasting peace. 

We advocate and demand that Turkey acts to end the Syrian regime’s attacks.